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A NEW CODE OF ETHICS FOR COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATORS: THE NEUTRALITY OF
PARTY-APPOINTED ARBITRATORS
ON A TRIPARTITE PANEL
Olga K. Byrne*
This natural right of self-regulation is a precious possession of a
democratic society, for it embodies the principles of indepen-
dence, self-reliance, equality, integrity, and responsibility, all of
which are of inestimable value to any community.1
It is a call for self-reliance, a way of living in harmony with our
neighbors, an endorsement of voluntarism.
Having an impartial and neutral judge resolve disputes has been
a fundamental goal in the American justice system.' But in some
arbitrations, party-appointed arbitrators on a tripartite panel are
expected to act as "non-neutrals" and may be predisposed to de-
cide in favor of the party who appointed them, while the third arbi-
trator is neutral. This system presents a problem to those who feel
that all adjudicators should be neutral when making a decision. In
international arbitration, for example, the rule is firm that arbitra-
tors must act in an independent and impartial manner, unless the
parties agree otherwise.' Since increasing numbers of commercial
disputes are international, professionals within the international
* J.D. candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2004. I would like to
thank Dean John D. Feerick for his guidance throughout my research and writing and
Judge Howard Holtzmann for his advice and analysis. I would also like to thank all
those who contributed to my research, especially Ms. Florence Peterson, Mr. Thomas
Stipanowich, Prof. Jay Siegel, Mr. Robert Holtzman, Mr. Harold Moskowitz, Mr.
Perry Kreidman, Mr. David Sheiffer, and Mr. Richard Adelman. The points made by
the author in this Note do not necessarily reflect the views of all of the persons whose
assistance is acknowledged.
1. FRANCES KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION: IT'S HISTORY, FUNCTIONS AND
ACHIEVEMENTS 4 (1948). Mr. Kellor was the first Vice-President of the American
Arbitration Association.
2. THEODORE W. KHEEL, THE KEYS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION: PROVEN METH-
ODS OF SETTLING DISPUTES VOLUNTARILY XI (1999). Mr. Kheel is the former execu-
tive director of the War Labor Board.
3. Deseriee A. Kennedy, Predisposed with Integrity: The Elusive Quest for Justice
in Tripartite Arbitrations, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 749, 749 (1995).
4. See International Arbitration Rules, Art. 7, American Arbitration Associa-
tion, Nov. 1, 2001 (stating that "arbitrators acting under these rules shall be impartial
and independent"); see also Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of
Commerce, Arts. 7(1) and 15(2), Oct. 3, 1993 (stating respectively that "every arbitra-
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community have urged that domestic commercial arbitration stan-
dards should more closely resemble international norms.5
The finality of arbitration is another reason for aspiring to a
higher standard of neutrality. Arbitration awards are final and
binding, subject to very limited review by the courts.6 Wide discre-
tion is left to the parties, their attorneys and the arbitrators to fash-
ion the procedure as they wish, without any judicial interference.7
The binding nature of arbitral awards requires a clear ethics code
to create some behavioral benchmark and uphold the integrity of
arbitration practice.8
Currently, the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") and
the American Bar Association ("ABA") are working to revise the
existing ethics code for commercial arbitrators in a way that en-
courages neutrality of all arbitrators. This Note refers to a text pre-
pared by a team from the AAA and the ABA (herein called the
"2003 Revision"). That text is expected to become effective March
1, 2004, but it must be recognized that at the time of this writing
(October 1, 2003), it had not been finally approved by either organ-
ization. The text had been approved by the Executive Committee
of the AAA, but was subject to further refinement, and it had not
yet been acted on by all of the concerned bodies of the ABA.
Meanwhile, the existing code of ethics remains in effect.
In the following analysis, Part I of this Note describes the impor-
tance of the tripartite panel and the new standards that it is ex-
pected will be adopted in a revised code of ethics for commercial
tor must be and remain independent of the parties involved in the arbitration" and
"in all cases, the Arbitral Tribunal shall act fairly and impartially").
5. MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §1:01 at 3 (3d
ed. 2001).
Commercial arbitration, as used generally, is not confined to traditional
commercial transactions.
It is also used to decide controversies arising out of building and engineering
contracts, agency and distribution arrangements, close corporation and part-
nership relations, separation agreements, individual employment contracts,
license agreements, leases, estate matters, contracts of government agencies
and municipal bodies with private firms for construction work, stock ex-
change transactions and controversies in the broad insurance field, reinsur-
ance arrangements, inter-insurance company subrogation claims, and in still
newer areas such as uninsured motorist accident claims, as well as those in-
volving medical malpractice.
Id.
6. See infra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
7. Id.
8. Interview with Florence Peterson, General Counsel, American Arbitration
Association, in New York, N.Y. (Sept. 13, 2002).
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arbitrators. Part II examines the opposing arguments concerning
the role of party-appointed arbitrators with respect to neutrality.
Proponents of an all-neutral panel urge that our judicial value sys-
tem should allow no other alternative, while others support the use
of non-neutrals when parties mutually agree to exercise their au-
tonomy to do that. Part III proposes that the revisers educate par-
ticipants in the arbitral process of the new standards demanded of
all arbitrators, so as to maintain confidence and stability in arbitra-
tion. Although arbitration is a private process and its construction
should be left substantially to the preference of the parties, ethical
norms create faith in the system and provide a reliable foundation
upon which to structure specific mechanisms for resolution.
I. THE ARBITRATION PROCESS
Arbitration is an alternative to litigation whereby parties volun-
tarily submit their dispute to a tribunal of their own choosing to
obtain a judicially enforceable decision.9 It is often chosen over
litigation for its speed, cost-effectiveness, privacy, and less hostile
atmosphere than the courts. 10 The parties may decide the scope
and content of the arbitration, define its procedures, and choose
the location of the arbitration by specifying these stipulations in
the arbitration agreement. 1 Most importantly, parties have the
power to choose the decision maker. 2 This freedom to select the
arbitrator is why arbitration has been described as "hiring your
own private judge."13 Section 5 of the Federal Arbitration Act ar-
ticulates the federal policy of enforcing the parties' right to com-
pose their own tribunal, stating: "If in the agreement provision be
made for a method of naming or appointing an arbitrator..., such
method shall be followed."1 4 Parties often want the arbitrator to
be an expert in the field of the dispute and may stipulate desired
9. THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §1:05 (Rev. ed. 2002);
ANTHONY WALTON, RUSSELL ON THE LAW OF ARBITRATION 1 (18th ed. 1970).
10. IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAw §3.2 (1st ed. 1995).
11. Id. at §2.6.2 ("In short, the parties can control the 'what,' 'where,' and 'how' of
the arbitration process and 'who' decides."); see also ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN
HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 5 (2d
ed. 1991) (explaining that the arbitration agreement is evidence that the parties have
consented to arbitrate their disputes). It is seen as an illustration of party autonomy,
since it expresses the will of the parties to conduct the proceedings according to their
particular needs. Id. The concept of party autonomy is referred to as l'autonomie de
la volontd in international arbitration. Id.
12. MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 10, at §3.2.
13. DOMKE, supra note 5, at 1.
14. 9 U.S.C. §5 (1925).
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qualifications in the arbitration agreement, such as technical back-
ground or industry experience. 15 In many industries, business pro-
fessionals prefer to settle their disputes through arbitration, where
the arbitrators are acquainted with trade customs and are more
likely to understand the parties' positions, rather than litigate
before a jury without such qualifications. 16 Courts are aware of
this benefit as well. Judge Posner acknowledged that parties "pre-
fer a tribunal knowledgeable about the subject matter of their dis-
pute to a generalist court with its austere impartiality but limited
knowledge of subject matter. '17
A. The Tripartite Panel
The arbitration agreement either designates the number of arbi-
trators that will decide the controversy, or refers to institutional
rules that provide a procedure to determine the tribunal's composi-
tion. 1 8 Common arrangements are either a single arbitrator or a
panel of three, wherein each party appoints one arbitrator and the
two party-appointed arbitrators agree on a third.19 This three-
member tribunal, known as a tripartite panel,20 has been chosen by
disputants to settle controversies for hundreds of years. For exam-
ple, George Washington indicated in his will that a tripartite panel
15. Jacqueline F. Drucker, Arbitration and Mediation of Wrongful Termination
Claims: Practical Considerations, Practising L. Inst., Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 150.
16. Letter from Roscoe Pound, Esq., Dean Emeritus of the Law School of
Harvard University (Feb. 11, 1953), 8 APR Disp. RESOL. J. 1, 1 (1953), reprinted in 56
APR Disp. RESOL. J. 45, 52 (2001). For historical background, see Jones, An Inquiry
into the History of the Adjudication of Mercantile Disputes in Great Britain and the
United States, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 446 (1928) (describing the use of expert deci-
sion-makers in specialized mercantile courts and private voluntary arbitration tribu-
nals to settle disputes among businessmen from the Middle Ages to the Colonial era).
"Mercantile cases have always, in one way or another, been decided by merchants."
Id. at 595.
17. Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 1983).
18. OEHMKE, supra note 9, at §34:08.
19. Id.; see also RODOLPHE J. A. DESEIFE, SOLVING DISPUTES THROUGH COM-
MERCIAL ARBITRATION §3:15 (1987) (stating that the decision to choose one or three
arbitrators may depend on the complexity of the case). When the arbitration refers to
the rules of the AAA, one arbitrator will hear disputes that are valued at less than
$50,000, while a panel of three arbitrators will generally decide cases that amount to a
higher value. Id. The requests of the parties are also taken into account when the
AAA must determine the panel. THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH & PETER H. KASKELL,
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST 91 (2001). A panel of two arbitrators is
seldom used because if the arbitrators disagree, there is no way of reaching a major-
ity. Id. Under CPR Arbitration Rules, the default is a panel of three arbitrators.
CPR INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, RULES FOR NON-ADMINISTERED ARBI-
TRATION (Rev. 2000), RULE 5.1.
20. STIPANOWICH & KASKELL, supra note 19, at 90.
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should be selected to resolve any controversy as to his estate: "All
disputes (if unhappily any should arise) shall be decided by three
impartial and intelligent men, known for their probity and good
understanding; two to be chosen by the disputants-each having
the choice of one-and the third by those two." 2 1
A tripartite panel may therefore consist of the two "party-ap-
pointed arbitrators" and a third arbitrator, who will generally be
referred to in this writing as "the neutral. ' 22 The custom of ap-
pointing a party arbitrator arose because of the risk that a single
arbitrator might not entirely appreciate the parties' positions.23
This system allows each party to have its own "judicial" ap-
pointee 24 on the panel who will make sure the party's position is
clearly and effectively presented to the neutral. 25 Party-appointed
arbitrators "help clarify technical issues ' 26 and offer assurance to
the parties that the third arbitrator "fully understands the issues
and background of the case, the contentions of each party, and the
possible implications of the award before it is issued. '27 They will
"see to it that the tribunal does not overlook the strong points of
[the appointing] party's case." 28 Throughout the course of the arbi-
tration, when the three arbitrators confer privately during execu-
tive sessions, they combine various viewpoints on the subject
area.29 This exchange of ideas should lead to a more thorough and
comprehensive decision. 30 Also, an award rendered by three per-
21. GEORGE WASHINGTON NORDHAM, GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE LAW 57-
58 (1982) (discussing also that George Washington had himself acted as an arbitrator).
Tripartite panels can be traced back much further than the colonial period. Some
evidence indicates that arbitrations in ancient Greece were most often conducted by a
three-member panel and that one of these three acted as "president" of the tribunal
who may have had the power to caste the ultimate deciding vote. MARCUS NEIBURH
TOD, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AMONGST THE GREEKS 102 (1913).
22. The third arbitrator may also be called an "umpire," "referee," or "chairman."
23. M. Scott Donahey, The Independence and Neutrality of Arbitrators, 9 J. INT'L.
ARB. 4, 39 (1992).
24. See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 759.
25. Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 485, 498
(1997); see also Astoria Medical Group v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater N.Y., 182
N.E.2d 85, 87 (N.Y. 1962) (stating that "the very reason each of the parties contracts
for the choice of his own arbitrator is to make certain that his 'side' will, in a sense, be
represented on the tribunal").
26. Rau, supra note 25, at 498.
27. Id.
28. Bernard Gold & Helmut F. Furth, The Use of Tripartite Boards in Labor,
Commercial, and International Arbitration, 68 HARV. L. REV. 293, 318 (1954).
29. STIPANOWICH & KASKELL, supra note 19, at 91.
30. See id.
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sons is often more acceptable to the parties and recourse to the
courts is therefore less likely.3
B. The Party-Appointed Arbitrators
In many domestic arbitrations that use a tripartite panel, the two
party-appointed arbitrators are not expected to be neutral, in the
same sense as the third arbitrator, but are permitted to be "predis-
posed toward the party who appointed them. '32 Courts have re-
peatedly upheld the parties' right to select non-neutral party-
appointed arbitrators.33
Lack of neutrality in arbitrators is not a novel feature of the arbi-
tral process. In medieval Iceland, partiality was a known charac-
teristic of arbitration.34 Arbitrators were not expected to be
neutral or impartial so long as they acted in moderation and re-
mained effective.35 In one documented case, a party who sought
compensation for the alleged murder of his son agreed to allow the
suspect's brother to arbitrate the matter.36 The arbitrator's relation
to one of the parties was not important because of his seemingly
fair behavior. 37 Similarly, in eleventh century France, where arbi-
tration was sometimes used to resolve property disputes, the par-
ties would usually select arbitrators who were relatives, friends or
business associates.38
Early labor arbitrations in the United States most often used
party-appointed arbitrators.39 The "so-called federal Arbitration
Act of 1888" strongly encouraged impartiality and disinterested-
31. Id. at 92; see also Arthur Lesser, Jr., Tripartite Boards or Single Arbitrators in
Voluntary Labor Arbitrations?, 5 ARB. J. 276, 279 (1950) (stating that when a tripar-
tite board is selected, "the resulting award will not only be more acceptable to the
parties, but also, being the product of collective judgment, will more likely be the
correct answer.").
32. CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES Canon VII
A(1) (1977) [hereinafter CODE OF ETHICS].
33. See Rau, supra note 25, at 500 (stating that "the lesson of the cases is that
courts must recognize that parties to an arbitration agreement are taken 'to have con-
tracted with reference to established practice and usage in the field of arbitration'"
(quoting Astoria Med. Group v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater N.Y., 182 N.E.2d 85, 88
(N.Y. 1962))).
34. William Ian Miller, Avoiding Legal Judgment: The Submission of Disputes to
Arbitration in Medieval Iceland, 28 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 95, 113 (1984).
35. Id. at 112-13.
36. Id. at 121.
37. Id.
38. Stephen D. White, Pactum . .. Legem Vincit et Amor Judicium: The Settlement
of Disputes by Compromise in Eleventh-Century Western France, 22 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 281, 282 (1978).
39. See Gold & Furth, supra note 28, at 294.
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ness,4° but subsequent legislation in labor arbitration failed to men-
tion the neutrality of the party-appointed arbitrators.4 Today,
party-appointed labor arbitrators are most often non-neutrals.42 In
commercial arbitration, the use of non-neutral versus neutral
party-appointed arbitrators is a choice left open to the parties.43 In
some circumstances, non-neutral arbitrators, because of a connec-
tion with or relationship to the appointing party, prompt the op-
posing party to challenge the validity of the award in court.
C. Judicial Review
Judicial interference in arbitration is very limited.44 Courts give
greater deference to an arbitrator's decision than they would to a
lower court, making it very difficult for the parties to have an
award overturned. 45 Generally speaking, arbitrators have author-
ity to devise remedies equal to that of the judiciary. 46 But unlike a
court, they need not give express reasons for the remedy they
grant,47 are not obliged to follow rules of evidence, 48 and may use
their own judgment or personal knowledge in making the deci-
sion.49 Under AAA commercial arbitration rules for domestic
cases, an arbitrator may "grant any remedy that the arbitrator
deems just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement of
40. Lesser, supra note 31, at 278.
41. Id.
42. See Gold & Furth, supra note 28, at 296 (stating that in labor arbitration,
"party-appointed arbitrators are almost always partisan" and "are often members of
the organizations that are parties to the dispute"). While the authors use the term
"partisan" to refer to party-appointed arbitrators who are less than neutral, this Note
will refer to them as "non-neutrals" to be consistent with the 1977 Code of Ethics for
Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes. See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
FOR ARBITRATORS OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT DISPUTES 2(B)(3)(a) (as amended
1985) (noting that "[labor] arbitrators establish personal relationships with many
company and union representatives, with fellow arbitrators, and with fellow members
of various professional associations.").
43. CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 32, at pmbl.
44. These limited statutory grounds are set out in the Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. §10 (a)(1)-(4) (2000). See also STIPANOWICH & KASKELL, supra note 19, at
281-85.
45. See STIPANOWICH & KASKELL, supra note 19, at 281-85.
46. Id. at 270; see also DOMKE, supra note 5, §1:05 (stating that "arbitration is
nothing short of the parties hiring their own private judge").
47. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598
(1960) ("Arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an
award."). This case applied to a domestic arbitration.
48. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 204 (1956).
49. Id.
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the parties." 50 Federal law does not provide a standard for courts
to scrutinize the legal issues underlying an arbitral award.51 As a
general rule, courts will not consider the legal merits to overturn an
award unless it was procured in "manifest disregard" of the law.52
By signing the agreement to arbitrate, parties express their un-
derstanding that in exchange for their ability to select the decision
maker, the award will be final and binding, subject to minimal gov-
ernment interference.5 3 Most often parties observe the award vol-
untarily. 54 But in the case of a challenge, the limited grounds
under which federal courts may vacate an arbitral award are out-
lined in section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act:
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and
for the district wherein the award was made may make an
order vacating the award upon the application of any party
to the arbitration:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or
undue means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in re-
fusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior
by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced;
or
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so im-
perfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and defi-
nite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.55
50. American Arbitration Association, Commercial Dispute Resolution Proce-
dures, § R-45 (Jan. 1, 1999).
51. Id.
52. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953) (overruled on other grounds); see also
Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1986) (reasoning by
the court that since the arbitrators had not clearly identified the law and then pro-
ceeded contrary to its provisions, the decision was not in manifest disregard of the
law).
53. See First Options v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995).
54. ALAN SCOTT RAU ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF
LAWYERS 730-31 (2002). The authors cite statistics that suggest less than one percent
of private sector labor arbitration awards are challenged in court. Id. (citing Feuille &
LeRoy, Grievance Arbitration Appeals in the Federal Courts: Facts and Figures, 45
ARB. J. 35 (1990)).
55. 9 U.S.C. §10 (a)(1)-(4) (2000) (emphasis added).
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Neutrality becomes a relevant issue if a party claims that the op-
posing party's arbitrator exhibited "evident partiality. '56 The bur-
den of proof rests on the party seeking vacatur of the award to
demonstrate that "a reasonable person would have to conclude
that an arbitrator was partial to the other party to the arbitra-
tion. ' 57 A court generally considers four factors when determining
whether there was "evident partiality": "(1) The extent and charac-
ter of the personal interest, pecuniary or otherwise, of the arbitra-
tor in the proceeding; (2) the directness of the relationship between
the arbitrator and the party he is alleged to favor; (3) the connec-
tion of that relationship to the arbitration; and (4) the proximity in
time between the relationship and the proceeding. "58
Because of this limited reviewability of arbitral awards, clear
ethical standards are necessary to guide arbitrators to ensure fair-
ness and credibility in the practice of arbitration.59
D. The 1977 Code of Ethics
Legislators empowered arbitrators to resolve disputes. The pub-
lic, having reposed that authority in arbitrators, has an interest
in seeing that the arbitration is conducted justly, and the arbitra-
tors conversely have an obligation to the public.6"
Before 1977, no formal code of ethics for commercial arbitrators
existed and few instances of unethical conduct had arisen. 61 Then
one significant event initiated the development of the code that is
still followed by commercial arbitrators today.62 In about 1971, a
distinguished leader of the Bar was representing a party in an arbi-
tration.63 After the arbitration had begun, the client discovered
that the opposing party had hired the arbitrator's law firm as coun-
56. Michael F. Hoellering, International Arbitration Under U.S. Law and AAA
Rules, 20 ADR & THE LAW 197, 206 (1997).
57. ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., 173 F.3d 493, 500 (4th Cir. 1999).
58. Id.
59. Interview with Florence Peterson, supra note 8.
60. Interview with Judge Howard M. Holtzmann, Chairman, Joint Committee of
the ABA and the AAA that prepared the 1977 Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in
Commercial Disputes, in New York, N.Y. (Mar. 8, 2003).
61. CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 32, at pmbl. In 1951, the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service wrote and endorsed the Code of Ethics and Procedural Stan-
dards for Labor-Management Arbitration, but this did not apply to commercial dis-
putes. CODE OF ETHICS AND PROCEDURAL STANDARDS FOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT
ARBITRATION, pmbl. (1951).
62. Howard M. Holtzmann, Notes for Lecture on Ethics for Arbitrators, Yale Law
School (Apr. 25-26, 2002).
63. Id. at section 11.
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sel.6 4 A different partner in the firm handled the matter and it per-
tained to an issue separate from the subject of the arbitration, but
the attorney was unwilling to readily accept this apparent lack of
independence.65 He contacted the Chair of the Executive Commit-
tee of the AAA, Judge Howard Holtzmann, to request a copy of
the code of ethics.66 When Mr. Holtzmann responded that no such
code existed, the attorney strongly urged that one be created. 67 As
a result, the ABA and the AAA each appointed a five-member
special committee with Judge Holtzmann acting as Chairman.68 In
1977, the committees jointly completed the first Code of Ethics for
Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes. 69
The drafters believed the Code of Ethics would encourage high
standards of integrity and lasting confidence in the process of arbi-
tration. 70 The preamble states that since commercial arbitration
formed "a significant part of the system of justice on which our
society relies for fair determination of legal rights .... [it was] in
the public interest to set forth generally accepted standards of ethi-
cal conduct for guidance of arbitrators and parties in commercial
disputes. ' '71 Since its inception, the Code of Ethics has been
largely followed and it continues to be in effect today.72
E. Updating the Code of Ethics
Eight years ago, a committee of the ABA embarked on a project
to update the 1977 Code.73 The plan began to develop after the
AAA asked Robert Holtzman to give lectures on arbitration that
would be used for promotional purposes.74 Before giving the lec-
ture, however, he found that under Canon I(B) of the Code of Eth-
ics, advertising and promotion of arbitral services were in fact





68. Id. at section 2.
69. Id.
70. CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 32, at pmbl.
71. Id.
72. John D. Feerick, The 1977 Code of Ethics for Arbitrators: An Outside Perspec-
tive, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 907, 925 (2002).
73. Telephone Interview with Robert A. Holtzman, Partner, Loeb & Loeb (Oct.
25, 2002).
74. Id.
75. CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 32, at Canon I(B) (stating "It is inconsistent with




practice at the time the 1977 Code was written provoked sugges-
tions that the Code be revised.76 The ABA convened an ad hoc
committee of representatives from the ABA Section of Dispute
Resolution, the Ethics Committee of the ABA, and representatives
from the AAA, and the Center for Public Resources to revise the
Code.77 They worked from 1995 to 1999, making changes in the
areas of disclosure78 and promotions and advertising, 79 developing
a version they thought would easily be approved by the ABA
House of Delegates.°
Several sections of the ABA assessed the revisions. 8' To the au-
thors' surprise, the Section of International Law and Practice
("SILP") returned it with some heavy criticism on a new issue that
had not yet been addressed.82 The Code of Ethics recognized the
ethical obligations of the neutral arbitrator on a tripartite panel
separately from those of the two party-appointees, who were pre-
sumed to be acting as non-neutrals unless the parties agreed other-
wise.83 It provided no guidance, however, for the situation in
which arbitrators are party-appointed and also act as neutrals. 84
International practice, on the other hand, generally mandates a
strict standard that all arbitrators, no matter how they are ap-
pointed, must be neutral. 85 Since commercial disputes have be-
come increasingly transnational in nature and may not fit as
precisely into the category of either domestic or international arbi-
tration,86 the international constituents of the ABA urged the
76. See Telephone Interview with Robert A. Holtzman, supra note 73.
77. Id.
78. Id. Standards for arbitration disclosure had become much more sophisticated
since the time of the original code. It was particularly weak on the standard of com-
munication pre-appointment. Id.
79. Id. Canon I(B) forbade solicitations of appointment, but in fact, arbitrators
and arbitral institutes were advertising their services, so the Code of Ethics was no
longer consistent with the practice. Id. A revised version of the code allows discreet
advertising and promotion. CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL DiSPUTES Canon VIII (Working Draft 2001) [herein-
after WORKING DRAFT 2001].
80. Telephone Interview with Robert A. Holtzman, supra note 73.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.; see also CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 32, at Canon VII.
84. Id.
85. International Arbitration Rules, supra note 4, at Art. 7. The standards set
forth in international arbitration rules for independence and impartiality do not dif-
ferentiate between party-appointed arbitrators and the third neutral. M. Scott
Donahey, The Independence and Neutrality of Arbitrators, 9 J. INT'L. ARB. 4, 39
(1992).
86. See WORKING DRAFT 2001, supra note 79, at intro.
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drafters to conform the Code of Ethics to fundamental interna-
tional norms.8 7 The SILP also advised the drafters to reassess dis-
closure requirements as well as the use of non-neutrals.88 The goal
was to devise an ethics code that would apply to domestic and in-
ternational commercial arbitrations89 without distinction. 90 Carol
Emory, Chair of the ABA Dispute Resolution Section, formed the
Ethics Task Force ("Task Force") to take on this new issue of neu-
trality. 91 The Task Force began to draft a new code in order to
completely reassess the role of party-appointed arbitrators.92
1. The Change in Presumption
The largest contribution of the Task Force was a change in the
presumption of neutrality in situations where the parties either do
not agree or do not specify whether party-appointees will be neu-
tral or non-neutral. 93 Under the 1977 Code of Ethics, the presump-
tion is that party-appointees are non-neutral. 94 Canon VII states
87. Telephone Interview with Robert A. Holtzman, supra note 73.
88. Id.
89. For comparison of international standards, see the International Bar Associa-
tion Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators at §3.1. "The criteria for assessing
questions relating to bias are impartiality and independence. Partiality arises where
an arbitrator favours one of the parties, or where he is prejudiced in relation to the
subject-matter of the dispute. Dependence arises from relationships between an arbi-
trator and one of the parties, or with someone closely connected with one of the
parties." Id.
Facts which might lead a reasonable person, not knowing the arbitrator's
true state of mind, to consider that he is dependent on a party create an
appearance of bias. The same is true if an arbitrator has a material interest
in the outcome of the dispute, or if he has already taken a position in rela-
tion to it. The appearance of bias is best overcome by full disclosure ....
Id. at §3.2.
90. WORKING DRAFT 2001, supra note 79, at intro.
91. Telephone Interview with Robert A. Holtzman, supra note 73. The Ethics
Task Force consisted of seven members from the ABA, including: Carol Emory, from
the Section of Dispute Resolution; Stephen G. Harvey, from the Section of Business
Law; Robert A. Holtzman, from the Section of Dispute Resolution; Carolyn B.
Lamm, from the Section of Litigation; E. Nobles Lowe, from the Senior Lawyers
Division; Kenneth B. Reisenfeld, from the Section of International Law & Practice;
and Hugh E. Reynolds, from the Section of Torts and Insurance Practice. CODE OF
ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL Dis-
PUTES at intro [hereinafter 2002 REVISION]. Others who participated in preparing the
final 2002 Revision included the Honorable Winslow Christian of the College of Com-
mercial Arbitrators; Florence Peterson, General Counsel of the AAA; Gerald F. Phil-
lips, from Phillips, Lerner & Lauzon; and Thomas G. Stipanovich, President of the
CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution. Id.
92. Telephone Interview with Robert A. Holtzman, supra note 73.
93. Id.
94. CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 32, at Canon VII, Introductory Note.
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that, "party-appointed arbitrators should be considered non-neu-
trals unless both parties inform the arbitrators that all three arbi-
trators are to be neutral or unless the contract, the applicable
arbitration rules, or any governing law requires that all three arbi-
trators be neutral. ' 95
The revisers changed this default rule by reversing the presump-
tion in favor of neutrality. Under the most recent version, it is
"preferable for all arbitrators-including any party-appointed arbi-
trators-to be neutral, that is independent and impartial, and to
comply with the same ethical standards."96 Since some industries
have traditionally used non-neutrals, Canon X specifically ad-
dresses the ethical considerations for arbitrators who are not ex-
pected to be neutral. 97 Disclosure requirements and allowable ex
parte communications between parties and arbitrators also
changed.
2. Disclosure Revised
Allegations of impartiality usually arise out of failure to disclose
all circumstances and relationships that, from the parties' point of
view, may impair the arbitrator's ability to judge impartially. 98
More fully developed disclosure requirements help to establish
confidence in the process of arbitration and in the particular tribu-
nal.99 The revised code increases disclosure requirements 00 and
holds non-neutrals to the same standards of disclosure as neu-
trals. 10' The original code requires non-neutrals to disclose rela-
tionships with the parties, but they "need not include as detailed
information as is expected from persons appointed as neutral arbi-
trators.' 0 2 The new disclosure requirements encourage neutrality
by raising the bar as to what must be disclosed.10 3
95. Id. at Canon VII.
96. THE CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, 2003 Revision, Canon X [hereinafter 2003 REVISION]. The
party-appointees are to comply with the same ethical standards as the third arbitrator.
Id. This requirement was not present in the 1977 Code of Ethics.
97. Id. at pmbl. The status of the party-appointed arbitrators should be settled
before or during the first meeting of the parties, and arbitrators not acting as neutrals
should follow the ethical obligations described in Canon X. Id. at Canon IX(B).
98. See Rau, supra note 25, at 490.
99. Charles N. Brower & Pierre-Yves Tschanz, The Role of an Arbitrator and How
to Select an Arbitrator, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 26, 30 (Law &
Business, Inc. 1983).
100. 2003 REVISION, supra note 96, at Canon II(A).
101. Id. at Canon X(B)(1).
102. CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 32, at Canon VII(B)(2).
103. Feerick, supra note 72, at 916.
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3. Ex Parte Communications Revised
The revision of the code also increases the amount of allowable
ex parte communications for both neutral and non-neutral arbitra-
tors. The 1977 Code did not allow arbitrators to discuss a case with
any party apart from three specific circumstances: 1) to coordinate
logistical matters, such as the time and place of the proceedings,
after which the arbitrator must inform the other party and allow
them an opportunity to respond; 2) when a party fails to be present
at a hearing an arbitrator may discuss the case with the party who
is present; or 3) any discussions requested or consented to by the
parties. 104 Canon III(B) of the revised code includes these three
circumstances and lists four additional situations in which parties
and arbitrators may engage in ex parte discussions. A prospective
arbitrator may inquire about the identities of the parties or the na-
ture of the dispute (being cautious to not discuss the merits of the
case) and may respond to the parties' inquiries concerning availa-
bility or qualifications.105 If the arbitration calls for a tripartite
panel, the parties may discuss the selection of the third arbitrator
with their party-appointed arbitrators.106 The revised Canon III
also allows party-appointed arbitrators and their appointing parties
to discuss the arbitrator's status as neutral or non-neutral.' 0 7 These
increased communications are designed to foster a more produc-
tive and efficient arbitral procedure.108
The provisions in Canon X of the 2003 Revision, however, are
more specific than the 1977 Code regarding ex parte communica-
tions for non-neutrals.10 9 Oral communications between a non-
neutral and the third arbitrator, concerning any matter or issue
pertinent to the case, are prohibited in the absence of the other
non-neutral arbitrator."10 When a non-neutral communicates in
writing with the neutral, a copy must be sent to the other non-neu-
tral arbitrator.' 1'
104. CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 32, at Canon II(B)(1)-(3).
105. 2003 REVISION, supra note 96, at Canon III(B)(1).
106. Id. at Canon III(B)(2).
107. Id. at Canon IV(B)(4).
108. Feerick, supra note 72, at 915.
109. 2003 REVISION, supra note 96, at Canon X(C)(4).
110. Id. One commentator believed this prohibition to be too strict, since the neu-
tral could disclose the nature of any oral communications held in private with one
non-neutral to the other non-neutral. See Feerick, supra note 72, at 922.
111. 2003 Revision, supra note 96, at Canon X(C)(4).
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F. The International Standard Compared
International commercial arbitration rules and ethics codes re-
quire that every arbitrator act impartially and independently of the
parties involved in the arbitration. 1 2 Independence is assessed by
examining any relationships the arbitrator maintains with the par-
ties in personal, social, and financial contexts.113 An arbitrator be-
comes less independent if these relationships become closer.1 14
The concept of independence in international arbitration applies
to party-appointed arbitrators as well as the chairperson.115 The
International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") requires all arbitra-
tors to disclose facts and circumstances to the Secretary General
that may affect their independence, such as, "any past or present
relationship, direct or indirect, with any of the parties, their coun-
sel, whether financial, professional or of another kind."'1 16 Evi-
dence reveals that even in practice, party arbitrators generally
adhere to the norms of independence and impartiality."17
The revisers of the ABA/AAA Code of Ethics have dedicated
themselves to rewrite a standard for arbitrators that is more similar
to that embraced by the international community." 8 In the 2003
Revision, Canon I(B) states: "One should accept appointment as
an arbitrator only if fully satisfied (1) that he or she can serve with-
out bias; [and] (2) that he or she can serve independently from the
112. International Arbitration Rules, supra note 4, at Art. 7. Independence is the
"defining requirement" for arbitrators at the International Chamber of Commerce
("ICC"). See W. LAWRENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COM-
MERCE ARBITRATION §13.02 (2000).
113. Donahey, supra note 85, at 31.
114. Id. This is an objective test for the appearance of bias rather than for actual
bias.
Thus, although it is possible for someone who is closely related to a party, in
a party's employ, or a close friend of a party, to be able to judge that party's
case without bias toward that party, the other party in the matter would
likely doubt the impartiality of the arbitrator under the circumstances.
Id.
115. CRAIG ET AL., supra note 112, at §12.04. Party nominees should not proceed
as the "agent or representative" of the appointing party. Id.
116. Id. at 59. If the arbitrator does not disclose any facts or circumstances or there
is no objection to disclosures that are made, the Secretary General may confirm the
nomination. Id. If the Secretary General does not confirm the nomination, the issue
will be handed over to the Court of Arbitration. Id. The Court administers and su-
pervises ICC arbitration; it is not a court in the original sense that decides cases. See
CRAIG ET AL., supra note 112, at § 2.03.
117. Id. at n.16. This was the universal custom in Europe and is now the interna-
tional standard. Id.
118. Peterson, supra note 8.
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parties, potential witnesses and the other arbitrators.""' 9 This stip-
ulation, which mimics the international standard of independence
and impartiality, 20 is not present in the 1977 Code of Ethics. 12 1
Canon X of the 2003 Revision, however, exempts non-neutrals
from these requirements, 22 indicating that they are not held to the
same standards of independence and freedom from bias as are
neutrals.
Non-neutrals under Canon X are also not obliged to follow parts
(C) and (D) of Canon 1,123 which address relationships between an
arbitrator and the parties, and conduct of the arbitrator which may
affect impartiality or the appearance of impartiality:
(C) After accepting appointment and while serving as arbitrator
a person should avoid entering into any financial, business,
professional or personal relationship, or acquiring any fi-
nancial or personal interest that is likely to affect impartial-
ity or that might reasonably create the appearance of"
partiality or bias. For a reasonable period after the decision
of a case, persons who have served as arbitrators should
avoid entering into any such relationship, or acquiring any
such interest, in circumstances that might reasonably create
the appearance that they had been influenced in the arbi-
tration by the prospective relationship or interest.
(D) Arbitrators should conduct themselves in a way that is fair
to all parties and should not be swayed by outside pressure,
by public clamor, by fear of criticism or by self-interest.
They should avoid conduct and statements that give the ap-
pearance of partiality toward any party. They should guard
against partiality or prejudice based on any party's personal
characteristics, background or performance at the
arbitration.124
The types of relationships enumerated in (C) are very similar to
those the ICC Secretary General is concerned with when assessing
a potential international arbitrator's independence. 125 But the Ca-
119. 2003 REVISION, supra note 96, Canon I(B).
120. International Arbitration Rules, supra note 4, at Art. 7. The Dictionary of
Conflict Resolution defines impartiality as "freedom from favoritism or bias." DOUG-
LAS H. YARN, DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 216 (1999) (quoting Ethical
Standards of Professional Responsibility, adopted by the Society of Professionals in
Dispute Resolution in June 1986).
121. See CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 32.
122. 2003 REVISION, supra note 96, Canon X(A)(2).
123. Id.
124. Id. Canon I(C)-(D). The 1977 Code contained very similar provisions. See
Code of Ethics, supra note 32 Canon I(D)-(E).
125. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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non X domestic arbitrator, who is exempt from these provisions, is
held to a lower standard.126
While international arbitration rules do adhere to strict stan-
dards, parties are nonetheless free to contract out of arbitrator in-
dependence, although it is very rare in ICC cases and the
nomination may or may not be validated by the Court of Arbitra-
tion. 1 27 Commentators argue that it would not be desirable to se-
lect someone who would act as an advocate. 128 The third arbitrator
would immediately detect this and the natural response would
likely be to favor the other party with the less zealous arbitrator,
and be more supportive of that side's case.129
The international standard of independence was analyzed before
a United States District Court in Fertilizer Corp. of India et al. v.
IDI Management Inc.130 The arbitrator appointed by Fertilizer
Corp. ("FCI") had previously served for FCI as counsel in at least
two litigations or arbitrations.1 3 1 This fact was not disclosed to the
opposing party.13 2  When FCI moved for enforcement of the
award, IDI asserted that FCI's relationship with that arbitrator vio-
lated the United States public policy pronounced by the Supreme
Court that all arbitrators must be free from even the appearance of
bias, not only actual bias.133 The court distinguished the case
before it from a previous case, which dealt with the third neutral
arbitrator, while this case concerned a party-appointed arbitra-
tor.13 1 It followed a Second Circuit case instead, which held that
arbitral awards should not be vacated for merely the appearance of
bias. 31 Since the award was not contrary to United States public
126. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
127. CRAIG ET AL., supra note 112, at §12.04.
128. Brower & Tschanz, supra note 99, at 26; CRAIG ET AL, supra note 112, at
§12.04.
129. Id.
130. 517 F.Supp. 948 (S.D. Ohio, 1981). Each party had appointed an arbitrator
pursuant to ICC Rules. Id. at 950.
131. Id. at 953.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 953 (citing Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S.
145 (1968)). Under Article V(2)(b) of the Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, recognition and enforcement may be refused
"if the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is
sought finds that the recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to
the public policy of that country." Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 7, 1959, art. 5, para. 2, 330 U.N.T.S 38.
134. Fertilizer Corp., 517 F.Supp. at 955.
135. Int'l Produce, Inc. v. A/S Rosshavet, 638 F.2d 548, 551 (2d Cir. 1981). But see
Tamari v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 619 F.2d 1196, 1201-02 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding
that plaintiffs failed to state a claim of bias or the appearance of bias, but maintaining
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policy, it was final and enforceable. 136 The better policy, the court
decided, was "that which favors arbitration, both domestic and
international."137
Neutrality, in the international context, usually refers to a politi-
cal or cultural association.138 An arbitrator is considered "neutral"
when he or she is of a different nationality than either of the par-
ties. 139 But a party in international arbitration may freely appoint
an arbitrator from its home country, of the same social and eco-
nomic background, or of the same political affiliation.' So in this
sense, the party-nominated, international arbitrator, who may be
like-minded and therefore more sympathetic to the appointing
party, is not entirely neutral. 1 '
II. NEUTRALITY AND THE PROPER ROLE OF AN ARBITRATOR
A. The Role of Arbitrators in the Colonies
Settlers in the Colonies that became the United States relied
heavily upon arbitration as a cost-efficient and neighborly alterna-
tive to litigation. 4 2 Professor Bruce H. Mann described how arbi-
trators in seventeenth-century Connecticut used their positions in
the community to facilitate the private resolution of disputes 4 3 at a
time when arbitral awards were unenforceable in court. 44 The
proximity of the arbitrators to the disputants, who were often from
the principles of Commonwealth Coatings that 9 U.S.C. §10(b) implicitly allows the
appearance of bias to void an arbitration award).
136. Fertilizer Corp., 517 F.Supp. at 955.
137. Id. IDI later filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. Fertilizer
Corp. of India v. IDI Management Inc., 530 F.Supp. 542, 542 (S.D. Ohio 1981). It
argued that independence and disclosure were fundamental values of both the 1955
and the 1975 ICC Rules. Id. at 543. This award had been rendered under the 1955
Rules. CRAIG ET AL. supra note 112, at §13.03. The court, however, did not reverse
its decision, particularly because the award rendered was unanimous and the court
found that the relations between the arbitrator and FCI did not taint the award so
that it would be contrary to public policy. Id.
138. Donahey, supra note 85, at 32.
139. Id.
140. CRAIG ET AL., supra note 112, at §12.04.
141. Id. "Even today it is not clear whether an 'independent' arbitrator need be
neutral." Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Mgmt. Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948, 954 (S.D. Ohio
1981).
142. Bruce H. Mann, The Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration Before the
American Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 443-44 (1984).
143. Id. at 448-52.
144. Id. at 454. "The cohesiveness of the community, fostered by the necessity of
living together in a physical and spiritual wilderness, gave adequate assurance that the
parties would abide by the award of the arbitrators they had chosen." Id. at 455. A
party who did not comply with an award "risked community disapproval." Id.
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the same town as one another, 145 enhanced the "bond between ar-
bitration and community."'1 46 Based on existing records, Professor
Mann contends that parties favored "local arbitrators, who would
likely be familiar with the parties and the dispute. ' 147 But as new
colonial towns emerged and mercantile business expanded, cohe-
siveness in the communities weakened. 148 By 1730, parties could
no longer depend on the personal authority of the arbitrators to
assure performance of the award.1 49
Arbitration became more formalized when Connecticut adopted
the first law on arbitration in 1753,150 whereby failure to comply
with the award would be punishable for contempt of court. 151 The
Connecticut act, like its forerunner, the English Arbitration Act of
1698,152 was addressed particularly to the needs of the growing
mercantile community. As merchants dealt more frequently with
strangers, they needed more than just the good faith of the parties
145. Id. at 454. Jurors, on the other hand, were taken from anywhere in the colony.
Id.
146. Id. at 455.
147. Id. at n.45. The arbitrators' positions in the community as well as perhaps a
relationship with the disputants allowed them to persuade the parties to follow
through with the awards. Id. at 454-55.
148. Id. at 458.
149. Id. at 460. "After making the award, the arbitrators could either return the
notes to their makers or turn them both over to the party in whose favor they had
decided." Id. This "gave arbitrators a means of securing compliance with their awards
that they did not have before." Id. at 461. The author cites the following example:
[W]hen Eleazer Kilborn and Josiah Griswold of Wethersfield, Connecticut,
selected Daniel Hovey and Joseph Herrick, two strangers whom Kilborn had
met on the highway, to arbitrate their dispute over a slave in 1748, the arbi-
trators 'took much pains and used many arguments with ... Kilborn to per-
swade him to comply with [their] judgment' voluntarily. Because they were
strangers, the arbitrators had no personal authority, only the power implicit
in custody of the notes. When they could not persuade Kilborn to comply
with their award voluntarily, they had no alternative but to deliver his note
to Griswold.
Id. at 463 n.77 (citing Deposition of Daniel Hovey, Apr. 6, 1750, Kilborn v. Griswold,
16 Conn. Archives, Private Controversies (2d Ser.) 102, 103 (1750)).
150. Id. at 468, 473. Connecticut's "Act for the More Easy and Effectually Finishing
of Controversies by Arbitration" was the first of its kind in the Colonies. Id. at 468
n.100. New York passed a similar statute in 1791. Id. at 472 n.119.
151. Id. at 473.
152. For an explanation of the body of law known as the "law merchant" that gov-
erned legal issues amongst merchants and traders in seventeenth-century England,
see Jones, An Inquiry into the History of the Adjudication of Mercantile Disputes in
Great Britain and the United States, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 445 (1928). "Part of the
strength of the law merchant was that it left the adjudication of mercantile questions
to merchants. Arbitration, which allowed parties to choose their own judges, offered
the same advantage and thus played a favored role in the resolution of commercial
disputes." Mann, supra note 142, at 470.
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to secure compliance with the award.'53 After passage of the stat-
ute, "disputants submitted to arbitration with increasingly legalistic
expectations,"' 54 and with this, the parties' choice of arbitrators
changed as well. 155 "Arbitrators looked more like judges than they
did before. Indeed, many of them were judges." 156
The proper role of an arbitrator was transforming in the colonies
and it remained unclear in the nineteenth-century. In a Harvard
Law Review article, Nathan Isaacs contrasted the "legalistic view,"
which likens arbitrators to judges, with the "realistic view," gener-
ally adhered to by businesspeople, who see arbitrators as agents of
the parties.' 57 This "question of fiduciary or judge" affects the par-
ties' control over the arbitral procedure and the duties of the arbi-
trators to the parties. 158 Nineteenth-century courts dealt with the
issue inconsistently. 159 One judge in Tennessee sharply criticized
the realistic view:
An arbitrator is not an agent; he is not acting for and in the
stead of the party selecting him, whose interest it is his bounden
duty to protect, but as a person vested with power by the law to
examine and determine the matters in controversy, which have
been submitted to him, and whose imperative duty it is to do
equal justice to the parties disputant; his duties are more of a
judicial than a fiduciary character, and his determination par-
takes more of the nature of a judgment against, than a contract
on the part of the person to be charged.' 61
On the other hand, the author cited two opinions of Chief Justice
Gibson of Pennsylvania who asserted that it is precisely the agency
153. See Mann, supra note 142, at 469-72.
154. Id. at 475. It is important to note though, that the oldest arbitration committee
in the United States, the New York Chamber of Commerce, did not conform to this
rising legalistic perception of arbitration. Nathan Isaacs, Two Views on Commercial
Arbitration, 40 HARV. L. REV. 929, 934-35 (1927). For example, it was opposed to any
judicial review of arbitral awards, aside from vacating an award that was procured
through fraud. Id. The New York Chamber of Commerce, which was founded in
1768, constructed arbitration committees for merchants who chose to settle their dis-
agreements through arbitration. MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 10, at §4.3.1.2.
155. Mann, supra note 143, at 475.
156. Id. at 478. The author states that after 1754, in forty percent of arbitrations at
least one of the arbitrators was a justice of the peace, whereas before the statute,
parties rarely appointed them. Id. at 475 n.126.
157. Isaacs, supra note 154, at 932.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 933.
160. Id. (citing Collins v. Oliver, 4 Humph. 439, 440 (Tenn. 1844)).
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power vested in the arbitrators via the authorization in the parties'
agreement that gives rise to the arbitral award.16 a
A disagreement, similar to Isaacs' comparison of the legalistic
view and the realistic view, exists today in case law and commen-
tary over the role of party-appointed arbitrators on tripartite
panels.
B. Current Case Law
In the 1968 seminal case of Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v.
Continental Casualty Co., the Supreme Court held that "any tribu-
nal permitted by law to try cases and controversies not only must
be unbiased but also must avoid even the appearance of bias. 162
The neutral arbitrator on a tripartite panel had failed to disclose a
prior business relationship with one of the parties.163 Justice Black
reasoned that the relationship between the arbitrator and the party
required that the award be vacated. 64 Taking a legalistic view of
arbitration, he compared the ethical standards expected of an arbi-
trator to those demanded of an Article III judge, because if a judge
had failed to disclose a similarly close financial relationship with a
litigant, any decision thus rendered would undeniably be subject to
review. 165 He was concerned with the lack of judicial review over
arbitral decisions, stating: "[W]e should, if anything, be even more
scrupulous to safeguard the impartiality of arbitrators than judges,
since the former have completely free rein to decide the law as well
as the facts and are not subject to appellate review. "166
The holding in Commonwealth Coatings has pervaded arbitra-
tion jurisprudence. In Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v.
J. C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co., the District Court of Connecticut
161. Id. (citing Babb v. Stromberg, 14 Pa. 397 (1850); cf. Speer v. M'Chesney, 2
Watts & Serg. 233 (Pa. 1841)). Isaacs compares the English courts' ready acceptance
of the businessperson's view and postulates that this divergence with American courts
is due to a longer history of arbitration in England and possibly the influence of Con-
tinental arbitration practice. Id. at 940.
162. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968).
163. Id. The third member of the panel, the supposedly neutral member, carried
out a large business in Puerto Rico as an engineering consultant for construction
projects. Id. at 146. One of his regular clients in this business was the respondent in
this case, the prime contractor. Id. The business relationship was sporadic and they
had had no dealings for about a year prior to the arbitration. Id. Over four or five
years, the prime contractor had paid fees of approximately $12,000 to the arbitrator.
Id. The consultations even included some advice rendered on the project that was the
subject of this lawsuit. Id.
164. Id. at 150.
165. See id. at 148.
166. Id. at 149.
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cited Justice Black's opinion when it applied the evident partiality
standard to a non-neutral, party-appointed arbitrator on a tripar-
tite panel. 67 The plaintiff sought to disqualify the defendant's
party-appointed arbitrator after learning that he had engaged in ex
parte communications with the defendant prior to his selection as a
member of the panel; attempted to discuss the merits of the case
with the other party-appointed arbitrator prior to selection of the
third arbitrator; and then failed to disclose any of these communi-
cations to the plaintiff.168 Even though these allegations concerned
a known non-neutral arbitrator, the court confirmed that he must
nevertheless maintain his ethical duties and is obliged to "partici-
pate in the arbitration process in a fair, honest and good-faith man-
ner."' 169 The court suggested that the arbitrator's actions might
have been contrary to what is mandated in the Code of Ethics171
and may provide "a reasonable basis for which to sustain a claim of
evident partiality. 17'
Another line of cases, however, has rejected the stringent stan-
dard set out in Commonwealth Coatings, taking a more realistic
view of the arbitrator's role. In 1962, the Court of Appeals of New
York, in Astoria Medical Group v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater N. Y,
defended the parties' freedom to contract for non-neutral arbitra-
tors on a tripartite panel and distinguished the ethical obligations
of arbitrators from those of judges.1  This was an appeal to have a
party-appointed arbitrator disqualified before an award was ren-
dered because of his alleged partiality. 73 The parties' agreement
provided that each party appoints one arbitrator and those two ar-
bitrators agree on a third.17 1 If they could not reach agreement, the
167. 780 F.Supp. 885 (D. Conn. 1991). Michael F. Hoellering, former general coun-
sel of the AAA, commented on federal courts' treatment of the status and behavior of
party-appointed arbitrators in a 1993 article. Michael F. Hoellering, The Indepen-
dence of Party-Appointees, 209 N.Y. L.J. 105 (1993). He cited Metropolitan Property
& Casualty Ins. Co. as evidence that the flexibility allotted to party-appointed arbitra-
tors in domestic cases was lessening, as courts required a higher degree of neutrality
and less partisanship, drawing nearer to the international standard of impartiality and
independence. Id.
168. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 780 F.Supp. at 887-888.
169. Id. at 892.
170. Id. at 893. It also noted that the ex parte communications complained of were
not in accordance with the parties' agreement to arbitrate. Id.
171. Id. The court remanded the case to Connecticut state court. Id. at 896.
172. 182 N.E.2d 85 (N.Y. 1962) (stating that the court "may not rewite [the parties']
contract" and denying the notion that an arbitration is a "quasijudicial tribunal" that
imposes impartiality and dissociation from both the litigants and the dispute).




AAA would select the neutral arbitrator. 75 Appellant, Health In-
surance Plan ("HIP"), selected Dr. George Baehr, an incorporator
and former president of HIP, who was then serving as a director
and consultant to the company, as its arbitrator.176 Because of his
relationships with HIP, the Medical Groups moved to disqualify
Dr. Baehr and require HIP to select an impartial arbitrator. 177
The court reversed an order granting the motion to disqualify,
upholding the parties' freedom to contract for selection of the arbi-
trators and praising the unique value and expertise party-ap-
pointed arbitrators bring to the tripartite tribunal.' 78 The parties'
right to choose an arbitrator "would be of little moment were it to
comprehend solely the choice of a 'neutral.' It becomes a valued
right, which parties will bargain for and litigate over, only if it in-
volves a choice of one believed to be sympathetic to his position or
favorably disposed to him.' 79 The court stated that it would dis-
qualify a non-neutral party-appointed arbitrator only for overt mis-
conduct, not merely a subjective evaluation of a relationship with
the party.' 80
Last year, the Seventh Circuit similarly upheld the parties' right
to select non-neutral arbitrators.' It reversed an order to vacate
an award on grounds of evident partiality, rejecting the application
of section 10 (a)(2) where the parties have agreed to use non-neu-
trals.182 Judge Easterbrook strongly supported the parties' rights
to waive the protection of the Federal Arbitration Act, stating that
if "an agreement entitles parties to select interested (even be-




178. Id. at 87-90.
179. Id. at 88. The court warned, though, that even a non-neutral arbitrator must
act in good faith. Id. at 89. "Partisan he may be, but not dishonest." Id.
180. Id. This is contrary to the international standard which will evaluate objec-
tively the relationship between the party and the arbitrator. See supra note 114.
181. Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Life Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 617, 623 (2002).
182. Id. at 620. All American challenged the award on grounds of evident partiality
of Sphere Drake's party-appointed arbitrator, Ronald Jacks. Id. at 619-20. Four years
before the arbitration, as a partner for Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw, Jacks served as
counsel on an unrelated matter to the Bermuda subsidiary of Sphere Drake. Id. at
620-21. The district court judge concluded that Sphere Drake was Jacks' client even
though the subsidiary itself appointed him and paid the fees. Id. at 621.
183. Id. at 620. While this judgment called into question the federal courts' views
of the acceptable level of neutrality from a party-appointed arbitrator, the relation-
ship in question was relatively insignificant. The court reasoned that even had the
party-arbitrator been the neutral, his prior relationship with one of the parties would
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While courts are split as to whether merely the appearance of
bias is sufficient to vacate an arbitral award under section 10 (a)(2),
the trend seems to be that the parties' right to select non-neutral
party-appointed arbitrators will be upheld.
C. The Debate Over Neutrality
The Center for Public Resources Institute for Dispute Resolu-
tion ("CPR") has been a strong advocate of completely eliminating
non-neutrals from the process of arbitration.1 84 When CPR con-
vened a commission of over fifty experts in arbitration, the consen-
sus they arrived at was that all arbitrators on a panel should behave
as neutrals. 185 The commissioners denounced the non-neutral sys-
tem as disreputable to the practice of arbitration, ethically inappro-
priate, and damaging to an arbitrator's credibility.'8 6 They claim
that non-neutrals are more likely to engage in ethically questiona-
ble pressure tactics to further the interests of their appointing
party, such as delaying arbitral procedures, arriving late to hear-
ings, threatening to resign if the award is not completely satisfac-
tory, or prolonging the decision on a third arbitrator. 87 Delays in
selecting the neutral may cause serious problems because arbitra-
tion clauses often do not provide a time limit to appoint arbitrators
and there may not be a provision to deal with the situation of a
stalemate in choosing the panel. 88
CPR's domestic arbitration rules do not recognize a non-neutral
panel. The rules offer three alternatives for arbitrator appoint-
ment: 1) each party may appoint an arbitrator and the party-ap-
not have constituted evident partiality, nor would he have been disqualified for parti-
ality even had he served as a federal judge. Id. at 621.
184. STIPANOWICH & KASKELL, supra note 19, at 96.
185. Id.
186. Id. One commissioner, who had served as the chair on tripartite panels, swore
not to work on a panel with non-neutrals again because that arrangement forces the
third arbitrator to essentially conduct two arbitrations: first the arbitration hearings
and then the private deliberations of all three arbitrators. Id.
187. Id. at 95; See also Gold & Furth, supra note 28, at 310 (explaining that party-
appointed arbitrators sometimes withdraw from the arbitration intentionally to ex-
press dissatisfaction with the proceedings and to place pressure on the other arbitra-
tors). Such conduct, however, would be contrary to the 1977 Code of Ethics. See
CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 32 at Canons IV-V. The delay caused by tripartitism is
also attributable to the construction of the panel, regardless of whether the arbitrators
are neutrals or non-neutrals. Gold & Furth, supra note 28, at 313. Three people
instead of only one must be appointed and the proceedings must conform to three
separate, and presumably active, schedules. Id.
188. Gold & Furth, supra 28, at 313.
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pointees will then select a third, forming a tripartite panel;1 9 2) the
parties may agree on a "screened selection process" where the
party arbitrators will be unaware of who has chosen them and who
will be paying their fees; 190 or 3) in certain cases, CPR will appoint
the arbitrators. 191 Regardless of which selection process the parties
use, CPR requires that all arbitrators be independent and impar-
tial,' 92 and they must disclose any circumstances that may affect
impartiality or independence. 93
Stipanowich and Kaskell urge parties to avoid using party-ap-
pointed arbitrators completely, whether neutral or non-neutral, un-
less they "employ measures designed to avoid the abuses
associated with tripartite panels.' 94 They distinguish international
arbitration, where "differing legal and cultural perspectives" are
dealt with through the use of party-appointed arbitrators, because
such concerns are not present in disputes among domestic
parties.195
Despite such criticisms, however, many practitioners and attor-
neys support the use of non-neutral, party-appointed arbitrators as
a feature of freedom of contract.' 96 Under this theory, arbitration
is seen first as a matter of contract, rather than a form of adjudica-
tion. 9 "With respect to the neutrality of the arbitrators ... the
only serious inquiry ought to be one into the understanding and
underlying assumptions of the contracting parties." 19 Party auton-
omy justifies the appointment by each party of an arbitrator who is
non-neutral. 99 Consequently, it follows that general expectations
of arbitrators, in terms of neutrality and impartiality, should be
considerably more lenient than what is expected of judges. 00 Un-
like judges, arbitrators may come from the same industry and have
189. CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, Rules for Non-Administered Arbitra-
tion Rules 5.1-5.3 (2000).
190. Id. Rule 5.4.
191. Id. Rule 6.
192. Id. Rule 7.1.
193. Id. Rule 7.4
194. STIPANOWICH & KASKELL, supra note 19, at 95.
195. Id.
196. Rau, supra note 25, at 487.
197. Id. at 487.
198. Id.
199. See id., at 509 (explaining the potential benefits of using non-neutral
arbitrators).
200. Id. at 493-94.
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similar backgrounds as the parties.20 1 They are "not apart from but
of the marketplace. °202
As a matter of contract, an arbitration is influenced by the re-
spective bargaining strength of each party, especially if it is to be
understood as a means of reaching the same result the parties
would have reached had they settled on their own.20 3 Under this
theoretical framework, party-appointed arbitrators are a reflection
of the parties' positions in the dispute. The relative economic
strength of the parties, vis-A-vis one another would be indicated in
their choice of arbitrator.20 4
Lawyers who arbitrate in the reinsurance industry generally sup-
port the use of non-neutrals. During private deliberations of the
panel, the party-appointees have an opportunity to influence the
umpire. They have the occasion to hear the umpire speak frankly
about his or her initial views of the case and may then offer alter-
native outlooks in response.20 5 This often aids the advancement of
a more acceptable resolution for the parties.20 6
Some say non-neutrals facilitate compromise, either because the
neutral will seek a decision that the parties find mutually accept-
able, or alternatively, the neutral's own view, which would have
been the final decision had it been a single arbitrator panel, may be
modified to reach a more intermediate result.20 7 A three-zero deci-
sion in favor of one party may be a sign that the arbitrators reached
a compromise.20 8 In such a case, the arbitrator appointed by the
losing party may have been very valuable to that party by explain-
ing the realities of the case.20 9 Particularly when a damage award is
at stake, a three-zero decision often will be more acceptable even
to the losing party if that party is confident that its party-appointed
arbitrator put forth all arguments that would enhance its position
in terms of damages. 210
201. Id.
202. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (White,
J., concurring).
203. See Rau, supra note 25, at 511.
204. Id.
205. Interview with Perry Kreidman, Partner, Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman
& Dicker, in New York, NY (Jan. 13, 2003).
206. Interview with David Sheiffer, Partner, Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman &
Dicker, in New York, NY (Jan. 13, 2003).
207. Gold & Furth, supra note 28, at 305.





Another reason parties prefer non-neutral arbitrators in the re-
insurance industry is due to the relatively high stakes that are the
subject of the dispute.21' Parties may not feel entirely comfortable
with only one person deciding the issues when faced with such high
risks coupled with the limited rights to appeal an arbitral award.2 a2
A party-appointed arbitrator renders the decision more acceptable
because the parties know they have had someone who clearly un-
derstands their position on the panel.213
The relatively small network of reinsurance arbitrators also
makes the non-neutral system appealing.214 Disputing parties
choose technical experts, who are known for their experience and
knowledge in a particular field, as arbitrators.215 One attorney in
reinsurance arbitration believes that the vast connections in the in-
dustry and the familiarity among all the players place neutrality at
a different level.216 But they trust that the system will work. If a
party-arbitrator, in zealously advocating the appointing-party's po-
sition, lost cognizance of the reality of the case, that arbitrator
would lose credibility with the umpire. 21 7 The non-neutral may be
predisposed to one side of the case, but must maintain a genuine
approach to secure the vote of the neutral. Otherwise, the third
arbitrator might wish to call off further consultations with the ex-
cessively partial party arbitrator.21 8 For this reason, practitioners
validate the integrity of non-neutrals since it would be impractical
to act as an advocate irrespective of the merits.2 19
Non-neutral tripartitism may also serve to expedite the pro-
cess.220 After deliberating privately with the other arbitrators, a
non-neutral who is permitted to engage in ex parte communications
with the appointing party may be able to convey helpful informa-
211. Interview with Harold Moskowitz, Partner, Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz,
Edelman & Dicker, in New York, NY (Jan. 13, 2003).
212. Id.
213. Id.; see also Gold & Furth, supra note 28, at 302. The authors found this to be
true even when the losing party's arbitrator dissents. Id. at 307-08.
214. Interview with Harold Moskowitz, supra note 211.
215. Id. Most parties specify that the arbitrators be insurance executives. Id.
216. Interview with Perry Kreidman, supra note 205.
217. Interview with Harold Moskowitz, supra note 211.
218. Gold & Furth, supra note 28, at 297. An attorney explained that if party-
appointed arbitrators are so partisan that they lose the respect of the umpire, the
arbitration is essentially being decided by only one person, because the umpire's
swing vote will be uninfluenced by the other two arbitrators. This is undesirable in
reinsurance arbitration because clients are hesitant to entrust resolution of their high
stakes disputes to one person. Interview with Harold Moskowitz, supra note 211.
219. Id.
220. Interview with David Sheiffer, supra note 206.
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tion that will facilitate compromise. Lawyers have testified that
they are often more willing to move for settlement when their own
party-appointed arbitrator, whom they trust, explains what conces-
sions need to be made, rather than when it is the chairperson who
points out the weaknesses in their case.22'
Labor disputes generally use non-neutral arbitrators when the
arbitration clause calls for a tripartite board.222 In labor-manage-
ment arbitration, it has been the expectation of parties that a party-
appointed arbitrator will vote in favor of the appointing party, even
if the case is without merit and the arbitrator has personal reserva-
tions about the appointing party's position.223 Commercial arbitra-
tors are less intensely partisan in that sense.224 This difference may
be attributed to the pressure labor arbitrators face because of the
polarization between labor and management. 225 Disputes have a
political undertone that coerces the arbitrator to advocate unremit-
tingly. According to one source, a union-appointed arbitrator may
never be forgiven for voting in favor of management. 226 This po-
larization issue does not seem to exist in commercial arbitration.227
Parties select arbitrators who will understand their position and are
competent to persuade the neutral. The arbitrator can advance a
positive perception of the appointing party's case, comment on evi-
dence to clarify the party's position, and interrogate witnesses in a
221. Id.
222. See Gold & Furth, supra note 28, at 296 (stating that in labor arbitration,
"party-appointed arbitrators are almost always partisan" and "are often members of
the organizations that are parties to the dispute"); see also CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARBITRATORS OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT DISPUTES, 2(B)(3)(a)
(as amended 1985) (noting that "[labor] arbitrators establish personal relationships
with many company and union representatives, with fellow arbitrators, and with fel-
low members of various professional associations.").
223. Gold & Furth, supra note 28, at 318. Ted Kheel, an experienced and well-
known labor arbitrator, contends that party-arbitrators (who in the labor-manage-
ment model presumably act as non-neutrals) are useful in resolving certain types of
labor disputes. They are better in interest disputes, he argues, where the controversy
concerns the amount of the settlement because the party-appointees can increase the
leverage of the neutral by negotiating the sum. Mr. Kheel added that rights disputes
are best decided by a single arbitrator. Three person panels are more expensive and
time consuming and the rights dispute has tangible criteria by which to decide the
case according to contract law. Telephone Interview with Ted Kheel, Partner, Paul,
Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP (Nov. 15, 2002).
224. Id.






manner that extracts further supporting evidence, while still main-
taining a relatively objective stance on the merits.228
Questioning of witnesses may be particularly crucial to a party's
case because the neutral often accords a higher level of respect to
the arbitrator's cross-examinations than to those of the party's law-
yer.229 This is an opportunity to present flaws in the other party's
case and may be very advantageous to the party if executed effec-
tively by the party arbitrator. Non-neutral arbitrators may be more
effective in this area than neutral, party-appointed arbitrators.
One lawyer accounted an arbitration in which his arbitrator did not
look up to the practice of acting as a non-neutral. 230 The arbitrator
was well versed in the industry and quickly became aware of the
weaknesses in the case. 231 During cross-examinations, the arbitra-
tor elicited responses from witnesses that actually harmed his ap-
pointing party's case.232 This likely would not have occurred if the
arbitrator had been a shrewd non-neutral, keeping in mind the in-
terests of the appointing party.233
In reality, sometimes even the neutrality of the umpire on a tri-
partite panel is questionable, particularly by the party who did not
propose the selected umpire.2 34 For example, one lawyer explained
why he thought the concept of neutrality in arbitration might be
only a theoretical construct. 235 He described a case in which the
opposing party's chairperson candidate was ultimately chosen to be
the third arbitrator.236 His client lost the case and attributed that in
part to the other party securing its choice for the position of
chairperson.237
Arbitrators appointed by one party may inevitably be predis-
posed to that party to some degree. In international practice, there
is a theoretical commitment to independence, but "the arbitrator
may quite acceptably share the nationality, or political or economic
philosophy, or 'legal culture' of the party who has nominated
him-and may therefore be supposed from the very beginning to
228. Gold & Furth, supra note 28, at 318.
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be 'sympathetic' to that party's contentions. '23 Also, when arbi-
trators are appointed in part because of their expertise, they will
automatically be predisposed in a sense because of their back-
ground. "Even decisionmakers who think of themselves as scrupu-
lously neutral may be hard put to avoid the predispositions and
preconceptions that so often seem to accompany practical experi-
ence as well as purely technical 'expertise.' ",239
III. IMPLEMENTING THE CHANGES AND POSSIBLE EFFECTS
The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes has
been cited repeatedly by judges and carries a great deal of moral
weight.2 4 For this reason, Florence Peterson, General Counsel of
the AAA, suggested that the revisers should give great deference
to the original document.241
The success of the Code of Ethics may be partially attributable
to the extensive and thorough empirical evidence the drafters col-
lected while planning the code. They created a questionnaire and
distributed it to 39,000 persons in the United States.242 Over 12,000
of those people responded, of which approximately 7000 had
served as arbitrators within the previous five years and 4000 had
served as counsel in an arbitration.243 Two public hearings were
held to discuss issues in the new code and the drafters sent 51,000
copies of an "Exposure Draft" to bar associations, arbitral institu-
tions, law schools, and other persons interested in arbitration for
comments on their progress.244 Judge Holtzmann's group accumu-
238. Rau, supra note 25, at 507. The author quotes Judge Clifford, who said to
recognize the inherent partisanship in party-appointed arbitrators is "the only intel-
lectually honest approach to the situation." Id. at 509 (quoting Barcon Assocs., Inc. v.
Tri-County Asphalt Corp., 430 A.2d 214, 230 (N.J. 1981) (Clifford, J., dissenting)).
239. Id. at 516.
240. See e.g., Delta Mine Holding Co. v. AFC Coal Props., 280 F.3d 815, 818 (8th
Cir. 2001); ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 497 (4th Cir. 1999);
Sunkist Soft Drinks v. Sunkist Growers, 10 F.3d 753, 756 (11th Cir. 1993); Merit Ins.
Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 678 (7th Cir. 1983); National Bulk Carriers,
Inc. v. Princess Mgmt. Co., 597 F.2d 819, 824 (2d Cir. 1979); Valrose Maui, Inc. v.
Maclyn Morris, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1124 (S.D. Ha. 2000); LLT Int'l Inc. v. MCI
Telecomms. Corp., 18 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Metropolitan Prop. &
Cas. Ins. Co. v. J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 780 F.Supp. 885, 891 (D. Conn. 1991); Betz
v. Pankow, 31 Cal. App. 4th 1503, 1510 (Ct of App. 1995); Beebe Med. Ctr. v. Insight
Health Servs. Corp., 751 A.2d 426, 430 (Chanc. De. 1999).
241. Interview with Florence Peterson, supra note 8.
242. Howard Holtzmann, The First Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial




lated this data to construct a code that truly reflected the practice
of arbitration and what practitioners considered was ethical, rather
than draft a code made up of pontifications of legal and ethical
theorists.245
The revisers anticipate that reversing the presumption of neu-
trality will promote uniformity and integrity in the arbitral pro-
cess.246 But to make such a drastic change, the institutions that
endorse the new code should make efforts to reeducate parties and
arbitrators before any confusion results. 247 There is a substantial
risk that parties will arrive at a pre-arbitral conference and learn of
this new presumption for the first time, causing delay in the pro-
cess. 248 A more critical risk might materialize in a case where par-
ties do not follow the particular rules of any institution and
proceed ad hoc. As the preamble to the revision states:
There are many different types of commercial arbitration. Some
proceedings are conducted under arbitration rules established
by various organizations and trade associations, while others are
conducted without such rules. Although most proceedings are
arbitrated pursuant to voluntary agreement of the parties, cer-
tain types of disputes are submitted to arbitration by reason of
particular laws. This Code is intended to apply to all such pro-
ceedings in which disputes or claims are submitted for decision
to one or more arbitrators appointed in a manner provided by
an agreement of the parties, by applicable arbitration rules, or
by law.249
Suppose the issue of neutrality is never addressed and the par-
ties, who are proceeding ad hoc, carry out the arbitration as they
always had in the past, using non-neutrals. In such a case, a losing
party may challenge the award, arguing that since the parties were
silent as to neutrality, the party-appointees should have gone for-
ward as non-neutrals. Judge Holtzmann warns that no matter
what judgment the court reaches, increased litigation will create
uncertainty in arbitration.251 This would be contrary to the objec-
tive in the preamble to the 2002 Revision to maintain "continued
245. Interview with Judge Howard M. Holtzmann, supra note 60.
246. Interview with Florence Peterson, supra note 8.
247. Telephone interview with Judge Howard Holtzmann, Chairman, Joint Com-
mittee of the ABA and the AAA that prepared the 1977 Code of Ethics for Arbitra-
tors in Commercial Disputes (Mar. 9, 2003).
248. Id.
249. 2003 REVISION, supra note 96, at pmbl.
250. Interview with Judge Howard M. Holtzmann, supra note 60.
251. Id.
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confidence in the process of arbitration." '252 Since the code will ap-
ply to all commercial arbitrators, and not only to those who are
conducting the arbitration under the auspices of the AAA, the
ABA and the AAA should reeducate any party or arbitrator who
may be obligated to follow the code.253 Otherwise, it might be
preferable at this time that the revised code only applies to AAA
arbitrators. 4
CONCLUSION
Despite the ongoing debate and pending revisions concerning
the issue of neutrality, arbitration will remain a private, voluntary
process, in which the parties are free to tailor the proceedings to
meet their needs. The Code of Ethics provides behavioral gui-
dance for arbitrators and parties, but it is not binding. In evaluat-
ing a claim of evident partiality of an arbitrator, Judge Posner
commented, "Although we have great respect for the Commercial
Arbitration Rules and the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators, they are
not the proper starting point for an inquiry into an award's valid-
ity."'255 The Federal Arbitration Act controls judicial analysis of an
arbitration award.256 So long as the award is not procured through
fraud, the arbitrators do not exhibit evident partiality, and they do
not prejudice either of the parties, the award will be enforceable.
A precise set of ethical standards that are embraced by the entire
field of commercial arbitration, however, will strengthen and per-
meate the system in a way that cannot be ignored by the judiciary.
The new change of presumption in the revision to the Code of
Ethics will encourage a change in behavior by imposing neutrality
upon all party-appointed arbitrators, unless the parties' agreement,
applicable rules, or governing laws provide otherwise.2 5 7 This will
create uniformity among procedures of the domestic and the inter-
national community, which has strongly supported the use of an
all-neutral tribunal because independence and impartiality of all
arbitrators are the basic standards in international arbitration 258
and many domestic commercial disputes have international impli-
cations. 259 Since arbitration awards are final and binding on the
252. 2003 REvIsION, supra note 96, at pmbl.
253. Interview with Judge Howard M. Holtzmann, supra note 247.
254. Id.
255. Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 680 (1983).
256. Id.
257. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
259. 2002 REVISION, supra note 91, at pmbl.
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parties, with courts giving great deference to arbitrators' deci-
sions, 26 well-defined ethical standards should be fixed to ensure
that the arbitrator making the award is acting fairly.261
The advantages that seem to come from non-neutral, party-ap-
pointed arbitrators may not be impossible to achieve with an all-
neutral panel. Advocates of the system urge that non-neutrals
stimulate confidence in the parties because they feel comfortable
with someone who understands their position and can effectively
advocate this to the neutral. But international arbitration places
similar value on the impartial, party-appointed arbitrator, who is
expected to understand the laws and cultures of the appointing
party's country. Perhaps it is more important to appoint an arbi-
trator who is experienced in the field and who will also carry out
the proceedings in a fair and honest manner. Craig, Park, and
Paulsson commented: "The notion of true independence is not illu-
sory; it refers to a professional attitude that would prevent an arbi-
trator from compromising his convictions and his reputation only
to satisfy the party that named him. ' 262 This standard is not con-
trary to the ethical obligations that have been expected of non-
neutral party-appointed arbitrators in United States domestic
arbitrations.
A higher standard of neutrality can surely not be damaging to
the system, so long as parties retain their right to appoint non-neu-
trals under Canon X. The new standards should be implemented,
however, with care that parties who regularly resort to arbitration
will understand what to expect.
260. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
261. Interview with Florence Peterson, supra, note 8; see supra note 166 and accom-
panying text.
262. CRAIG ET AL, supra note 112, at §12.04.
184720031
11 C.
